The new Line of Control

 

 

It is surprising, always from the benefit of hindsight, how much Indian investigators and the media now know about Mumbai’s bloody slaughter. The light and sound, the flurry or charges and counter charges by various responsible hands in the government, and the unseemly recriminations in the aftermath of one of the greatest security disasters in recent times, has added a new word to the lexicon – `actionable intelligence.’

What is actionable intelligence? Consider the following:

November 22, 2008: (two days before the attack): Shivraj Patil tells India’s police chiefs: "To control terrorism in the hinterland, we have to see that infiltration does not take place through the sea routes.’’

November 13, 2008: (a fortnight before the assaults) PM tells BIMSTEC summit, "Terrorism and threats from the sea continue to challenge the authority of the state."

March 11, 2008: A.K. Antony warns International Maritime Search and Rescue Conference of the "dangers of terror attacks from the sea in the region", admitting that the Coast Guard faces shortage of manpower and hardware.

September 18, 2008: RAW intercepted a phone conversation in which a LeT source says there is a plan to target a hotel at the Gateway of India through the sea route.

September 24, 2008: RAW identifies hotels which could be attacked: Taj, Marriott, the Land's End and Sea Rock.

If the ultimate aim of terrorists – apart from causing mayhem, murder and demoralisation– was to discredit the Indian security establishment, then it is a job well done. Waking up in the aftermath of an onslaught which has claimed over 200 lives (an understated figure?) and many hundreds maimed, the story of many gaps in the government action makes up for a picture which is not new .In line of fire is the Naval chief, Admiral Sureesh Mehta. Defence Minister, A.K.Anthony, pulled up the Navy Chief asking him how they missed the intelligence warning?

The question is being asked against the background of the RAW intercept.

The Navy chief has other problems at hand. US Intelligence officials told the CNN that their government had warned India of a maritime attack on Mumbai. The message was conveyed twice, including once in the last week of October, 2008. Security was maintained for a week and then the guard was dropped since nothing happened during that period. “Indian officials are prone to look at short term gains and not the long term picture,” the American official told the CNN. The Navy chief has angrily refuted the charges saying ``there was no such RAW intercept which was handed over to us” and rather than a security lapse, it was a systems’ failure. Certain things have emerged clearly for which the Navy needs to answer. It is the first line of defence in international waters and the Coast Guards come as a second line, so to obliquely hint that Coast Guard was unable to pick up the trail of the killers is to put the cart before the horse. In addition, sources say that there is a lot left to be desired as far as coordination between the Navy and Coast Guard is concerned.

Now that broom closets are being opened, the callous neglect of the country's coastal defences is coming into sharp focus. India has 7,516 kilometers of coasts and most of it remains unmanned.

Gujarat and Maharashtra police officials examining the trail taken by the killers have interviewed fishermen on the coastlines of two states and the story that is emerging is of a coastline without any police restrictions, frequent and unregistered entries of fishermen back and fro Pakistan, forgery of smart I-cards issued by the Gujarat government identifying the fishermen, which according to one account, was flashed by the killers on the kidnapped boat, Kuber when accosted by an unnamed Coast Guard patrol.

The chickens are now suddenly coming to roost. The Fishermen Association in Gujarat has made available letters written to several authorities, including the police ,that there were many suspicious landings on deserted stretches along the beaches and there was evidence to suggest that RDX and arms consignments were being landed on a regular basis.

The danger, clearly, was omnipresent and omnipotent. According to Home Ministry report of November 2006, "terrorists have been collecting information regarding location of various refineries on or near the Indian coastline... Some LeT operatives are also being trained specifically for sabotage of oil installations. There are plans to occupy some uninhabited islands off the country's coastline to use them as bases for launching operations on the Indian coast...,” the report noted with a prescience that now appearschilling. A Defence Ministry report of March 2007 stated that there is real danger from sea. Quoting from the report, Defence minister, A.K.Anthony, informed the Lok Sabha that ``there are reports about terrorists of various tanzeems being imparted training and likelihood of their infiltration through sea routes..." When further queried by a MP whether "maritime terrorism, gun-running, drug-trafficking and piracy are major threats that India is facing from the sea borders of the country?", Anthony’s reply was a categorical `Yes, sir.’

At the Fourth Regional Security Summit in December, 2007, at Manama, National Security Adviser, M.K. Narayanan – now in the eye of the storm – told those assembled that "there are now certain new schools that are being established on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, which specialise in the training of an international brigade of terrorists to fight in many climes...According to our information, recruits from 14 to 15 countries have been identified as trainees there... —``.

This is no ordinary threat either. The Ministry maintained that ``studies had been conducted about important targets, with regard to vulnerability, accessibility, poor security, absence of proper counter-terrorism measures, etc. The sea route, in particular, is becoming the chosen route for carrying out many attacks, even on land. ''

Despite overwhelming evidence and warnings, no lessons have been learnt. In 2000, in the aftermath of the Kargil war, four task forces were set up. Of them, one was dedicated to border management. Defence doyen K.Subramaniam, who authored that report warned that "the long coastline with its inadequate policing makes it easy to land arms and explosives at isolated spots on the coast." He recalled that this was the route taken to smuggle explosives into Maharashtra in 1993 before the Mumbai blasts. "The situation, if anything, has worsened over the years with activities of the ISI becoming more widespread along the coast…Such coastal areas must be particularly kept under surveillance." That, sadly, is the last thing that the security establishment did. Dawood’s underworld and Mumbai attacks

While nothing has been said overtly about the role of underworld don Dawood Ibrahim in the attack on Mumbai, intelligence sleuths in Delhi say he played a key role. They are pretty clear that Dawood played an important role in transporting these terrorists to Indian soil, and claim there is evidence.

The fact is Dawood, who was used by ISI in engineering the 1993 blast, is completely in its control. Talking to TSI, O P Chatwal, an ex official of CBI, who spent a good part of his career investigating 1993 Mumbai blast and trying to extradite Dawood, said, “To do what ISI says is the only option left with Dawood. It is his compulsion and it is increasing by the day.” When, in 2003, US declared Dawood a notified terrorist, his options depleted considerably. “Pakistan government can cry hoarse that Dawood is not on its soil, India has definite proof of his whereabouts in Karachi and has handed them to Pakistan,” Chatwal adds.

US had put Dawood’s name in the list of wanted terrorists following revelations of his connections with Al-Qaeda. The Dawood is not the old don of the 1990s anymore. He is now an inseparable angle of ISI-AL Qaeda-underworld troika.

Well placed Intelligence sleuths say that a meeting was convened between October 15 to 17 at the Dhulikhel resort, 30 kilometers off Kathmandu. Called by the ISI, Dawood’s representative participated in the meeting. The meeting allegedly also involved operatives from HUJI, a terrorist gang based in Bangladesh, and SIMI. The meeting was apparently called to discuss the modus operandi of terror attacks to be carried out in India.

Neelu Ranjan Kumar Army ignores all politicians in Pakistan’

Captain Alok Bansal, a serving Naval officer and Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, tells Mayank Singh that politicians in Pakistan want peace, but not the Army and ISI

What lies ahead in Indo-Pak relations?

I feel that developments will affect Indo-Pak relations but not very significantly, if the US manages to pressurize Pakistan adequately. Recent developments have indicated that Pakistani Army and its rogue intelligence agency, ISI, are not under political control. The US might either take action against Lashkar (Jamaat ud Dawa) unilaterally or force Pakistan to hand over some of the people demanded by India to diffuse the situation.

Do you foresee any military options being exercised?

That possibility now is bleak but if the 20 men are not handed over and the issue does not fade from public memory, India may be forced to carry out a surgical strike on LeT HQ at Muridke or even target killing of its leadership by covert action.

Is Pakistan involved in the carnage?

I personally feel the recent attacks have been carried out by terrorists from LeT who have been influenced by Al Qaeda and trained by sections of Pak Army and ISI. The political government was neither consulted nor aware of the operations. The political leadership in Pakistan genuinely wants to improve relations with India but there is a strong bureaucratic-military resistance.

What according to you is the internal state of Pakistan?

Pakistan is a withering state and is being kept together by its Army. If the Army is weakened the state will wither away. The economy is in bad shape. The entire Pakhtoon belt has been affected by the virus of Islamic radicalism and the other ethnic troubles.

What can be done to control such activities?

Maritime security needs to be beefed up, at present the politicians and bureaucrats do not understand matters maritime. We need to set up an elaborate coastal security infrastructure, with coastal radar stations, transponders on fishing boats and marine police. Fishing needs to be regulated and vessels operating beyond a certain distance must have some communication equipment. There are multiple agencies dealing with maritime issues, to begin with an expert on maritime security, serving or retired, must be appointed as maritime security adviser with a maritime security advisory board. Delhi being so far off from the seas, not many security experts understand the peculiarities of maritime operations. ( Logistically, Karachi to Mumbai is three hours by a speed boat)