Soviet era up close & personal

There have been quite a few chroniclers of the demise of Soviet Union and they have managed to sell their accounts in eye-popping numbers, but even a cursory look can tell you that these writings have largely been superficial or pretentious at  best. Take for example David Remnick’s much celebrated ‘Lenin’s Tomb’. The book tries to chronicle the events as USSR implodes. But a few chapters in and you know that the writer is writing with a preconceived notion and that has affected his judgments to interpret the events in all capacity. The rancour against the empire and the jubilation on its demise are clear giveaways.

Under the circumstances, former top Gorbachev advisor Anatoly Sergeevich Chernyaev’s diary comes as a fresh air. Chernyaey has been a WW II veteran and rose in the ranks to become the adviser of Gorbachev. His vivid and lucid diary entries during and after the Cold War era gives an almost firsthand experience of what was churning inside Soviet Union. No doubt, Chernyaev has been an ideologue and he had deep belief in the system; it is also true that he never allowed his ideology to overpower his pragmatism. And that is why his diaries are such a joy to read.

In 2004, he sort of gave away his comprehensive diaries covering the years from 1972 through 1991, to the National Security Archive. This week, Washington DC based National Security Archive has released the final installment of his diary that takes us through the year 1991 as USSR implodes. Considering Chernyaev was himself instrumental in the enforcement of Perestroika, his understanding of the situation was very clear and offers a deep insight. The diary opens with an honest assessment of Gorbachev’s final years and Chernyaev has spared no words to describe what he thinks about his boss: “This is the year of my 70th anniversary. It is also the year of Gorbachev’s last chance and Perestroika’s last efforts. [Gorbachev] made a New Year’s address to the Soviet people. Yakovlev called today, saying,

You know, it seems the words aren’t very banal or anything. But it’s just out of steam!” I also catch myself thinking that no matter what Gorbachev says now, it really is “out of steam.” I felt this very acutely during the Congress. He is no longer regarded with respect or interest; at best, he is pitied. He has outlived his achievements, while disasters and chaos exacerbate the people’s irritation with him. He does not see this, from this stems his even greater drama. His overconfidence is becoming absurd, laughable even.” 

 
Clearly Gorbachev’s efforts were not bearing much fruit and Chernyaev, more than anyone else knew this. He was also quite sure that things will surely go out of  hands soon as it appeared that one after another several of Gorbachev’s closest associates started leaving him. More than anyone else, Foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze was the first to go on the pretext of looming dictatorship. And if that was not enough, the progressive “new thinker,” Alexander Yakovlev, also became increasingly more at odds with Gorbachev – who in Chernyaev’s account finds it increasingly tougher to outpace the wave of change that he himself had let loose.     

The amazing diary description of the August coup, from Chernyaev’s advantaged vision at the Gorbachev dacha at Foros, incarcerates the anxiety and ambiguity of the moment and provides thoughtful insights both on the coup plotters and on the way the unsuccessful rebellion left Gorbachev even more undermined. By the facts in the diary, Chernyaev was far along of Gorbachev in accepting that letting the Baltics and Georgia quietly leave the Soviet Union was the only still distant leeway of conserving the USSR as a democratising state.  Writing about the putsch, Chernyaev reflects: “Looks like it is time to start recording the events. If I don’t do it, nobody else will. And I happened to witness a turning point in history.

“Vyacheslav Vladimirovich Generalov showed up. We became well acquainted during Gorbachev’s trips abroad, where he usually was in charge of security. He is very polite. He asked Olga to leave us alone and took a seat. “Anatoly Sergeyevich, don’t get me wrong. They left me in charge here. I have orders not to let anyone out. Even if I allowed you to leave the premises, you would be immediately detained by the border guards: there is a triple semi-circle [of guards] from one sea shore to the other. The road to Sevastopol‐Yalta is closed off around here. You can see, there are three ships already at sea…”

“I asked him an innocent question: “What about signing the Union Treaty tomorrow?” He replied: “It will not be signed. The plane that came for M. S. was sent back to Moscow. The garages with his cars are sealed, and they guarded not by my people, but gunmen who were sent over here. I cannot even allow the extended service staff (local people—gardeners, cooks, cleaning ladies) to go home. I don’t know where I’m going to house them.”

“10 am 19 “Mayak” is broadcasting the message from the commandant of Moscow. The first clashes took place at night; attacks on the armoured vehicles and patrols on Smolenskaya Square (by the way, near the building where I live in Moscow. What my family must feel!) and by the building of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and the hotel. There are some killed and wounded. This means first blood. The Commandant is blaming everything on “disorderly elements” and criminals.” “12 pm on “Mayak”: Ivashko said in an address to Yanaev: the PB and the CC Secretariat cannot make a judgment about the events until they meet with the General Secretary of the CC CPSU, Gorbachev! This is something! Especially after the spilled blood.”

And that was not the only tension Gorbachev had. In fact, Chernyaev’s diary is full with accounts of the profound apprehensions between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, and Gorbachev’s massive irritation with the absence of concrete fiscal prop up from the West that could possibly have offered him a few stakes to deal with the hardliners and the radical reformers, leading to a rather event free soft landing for a demilitarised USSR – for example, at the G-7 Summit in July 1991 where Gorbachev came away empty-handed. Chernyaev has accounted that betrayal in no uncertain terms. 

We were in London from July 16-19th. It was a historic event. It feels as though a country hostile to the President does not want any of this. As soon as we saw our newspapers on the flight home, things turned upside down: a photo in Moskovsky Komsomolets, was captioned “7+1” and showed the seven leaders facing forward, and Gorbachev in profile and with his back turned… Everybody, right up to Khasbulatov, had a reserved reaction to the President’s visit to London. From tabloids to statesmen, nobody hides the fact that he went to get billions, so to speak, but did not get them! Thus, Gorbachev continues his revolution of “leading the country into the world,” while the country reacts with suspicion and hostility.