Of Comrades and Commissars

“There is great chaos under heaven, and the situation is excellent.”     

 Mao Zedong (1893-1976)

There has hardly been any indication ever that the Communist Party of China (CPC) dithers when it comes to operating in chaos. In fact, evidence suggests that they actually revel in it. On the contrary, it has been seen time and again that it is the west that sweats every time it fails to make a method out of the madness. And the current Chinese succession process has only strengthened this belief.
There has been a strange euphoria mixed with fear and glee in the west with regards to this succession process. What makes it even more interesting is the sheer absence of intelligence or background material on the possible successors or succession process. And this opens a huge space for speculation and theories where the west appears to be operating. But is this new?
Not at all. Experts and journalists with even modest memory will remember a similar, yet less paranoid, spree exactly a decade ago when Jiang Zemin was looking to hand over the reins to the 4th generation Communist leadership. The man at the helm of affairs was the current incumbent Hu Jintao, and western intelligence in general and American in particular were hopelessly ill-informed about him. Typical of CPC, the decision was taken a generation in advance and it was Deng Xiaoping's wish that Hu will succeed Jiang. It can be conceded that US did not see China as such a big threat to its world dominance and hence was a tad less paranoid. So when Newsweek promptly asked “Who is Hu?” on its cover, it was difficult to make out whether it reeked of condescension or admitted ignorance. Then too, as today, it was speculated whether Jiang Zemin will allow Hu to grow or will he keep wielding his power through the Politburo. What had made it all worse was that while Hu knew Stalinist North Korea like the back of his hand, he had never visited USA, the beacon of capitalism.
As the succession debate rages again, it can be safely said that the leadership under Hu Jintao was not even half as dramatic as it was speculated to be. Where does it all leave the current debate? Why is the western media less condescending and more fearful now?
The man who dons Jintao's shoe now is Xi Jinping. And as Hu had a decade ago, Xi at present holds the position of vice president. But the similarity ends there. Unlike Hu, Xi is going to take over the leadership of a rising and assertive superpower that sees itself as a challenger to the US. It is also a regime that stays buoyant as the industrialised west ails and begs for a bailout. The unprecedented scrutiny and focus is thus normal.
But like in the past, the west is again ill-informed about China's future leader in absence of solid intelligence. It became painfully obvious when WikiLeaks released some classified diplomatic cables from the US Embassy in Beijing a year or so ago. Apart from very general observations such as him having “strong ambitions” and being a “nice guy”, whatever that means; the celebrated American diplomats only dealt in rumours concerning his relationship or lack of it with his first wife and his apparent liking for Hollywood productions on WW II. Not a word more.
“China evokes rather convoluted and polarising opinion in the US. The politicians in the US spend time attempting to manipulate Americans' emotions rather than trigger their brains. And it serves the purpose for many. For example, nothing better could have happened to the US military-industrial complex or protectionism lobby in the last decade than China. So it is natural for them to speculate whether Xi, like his predecessor, is a conformist or has a few ideas of his own,” Seán Golden, a European expert on China based with CIDOB, tells TSUnlike a democracy where there is always a sense of curiosity and uncertainty regarding the next leader; a one-party leadership like China plans everything meticulously leaving no space for uncertainty and dissent.
If the heavens do not fall, Xi is all set to be anointed head of the CPC at the upcoming convention this October. He, in all certainty, will also succeed Hu as president of the People's Republic of China in early 2013. What is still in the dark zone is whether he is also likely to succeed Hu as the chairman of the military commission, a post that wields enormous power and is de facto merely below that of president. If he holds that post, then he also automatically becomes the commander-in-chief of the People's Liberation Army.
But president and chairman of the military commission  are not the only two posts in offing this fall. It is also expected that the incumbent deputy premier, Li Keqiang will also be promoted to the post of premier. Xi was not Hu's first choice for his successor. It was Li. But like Deng did in the case of Hu, Jiang put his authority behind Xi.
And then, there is the all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), which will see as many as seven new members out of the stipulated nine. It is being filled slowly as this report goes to print. But there is something else that has put this process under the spotlight: the purging of Bo Xilai, the iridescent Communist Party secretary of the city of Chongqing in southwest China.
The event has variously been termed as “the most significant political event in China since 1989” as well as “the most scandalous event after the Lin Biao scandal in 1971” when Lin Biao, Mao's chosen successor, was stigmatised and purged for scheming to subvert his patron's govt. Then, as Bo is being termed today, Lin was variously termed as “corrupt” and  “venal”. But there is something else in it.
Since the days of Deng, CPC has intentionally taken a route where PBSC and the Politburo and not individuals have been under the spotlight. In two generations after him, individual leaders have received less and less of brickbats and bouquets as the cult of halo worship waned. CPC today has the two powerful factions: the offspring of veterans of the revolution or the Princeling forms the Taizidang faction where as the cadres promoted through rigorous screening of Communist Youth League form the Tuanpai faction. To provide a level playing field, CPC has discouraged the use of individualistic slogans and Mao era symbolism. Bo, a princeling like XI, much to the chagrin of CPC, practised all these.
Says David Goodman, a Sydney-based expert on Chinese politics, while talking to TSI, “The decision to purge Bo has delivered the message that an open kind of politics based on individual charisma and personal whims will not be tolerated. It is another way of saying the days of Mao are over and any inspiration from him apart from the mundane ideological ones are strictly unwelcome by Zhongnanhai.”
Although ideology has been done away with from the critique of Bo Xilai in the official discourse, anyone willing to look deep can see a robust ideological deductions. There are other contours as well. The leadership change will also subtly send the message to elements within the PLA who appear to have grown too big for their shoes. It was made amply clear in the editorial by Hu Jintao in PLA Daily a few months ago. The article pressed the PLA to “resolutely resist the incursion of all kinds of erroneous ideas,” and to “not be disturbed by noise or be affected by rumours.”
CPC is trying its best to prop up support for itself among the armed forces as the unquestioned leader of the Republic. PLA's ambitions have increased in the last few years and has at times not harmonised with those of CPC. It was evident from some of the sudden decisions on PLA's part like the 2011 test flight of the J-20 fighter plane during Robert Gates' visit to China and its 2007 anti-satellite missile test, both of which took the west and CPC by surprise.
CPC is in no mood to take more of these surprises and wants a Politburo that is assertive and less secretive. Years ago, Deng Xiaoping had famously said, “Hide your brightness, bide your time”. CPC thinks that both the Republic as well as the Party has done enough of it. It's time to come out.

saurabhshahi@thesundayindian.com