The Spillover Effect

When Hezbollah fighters first started laying out the plan to liberate al-Qusayr with the help of the Syrian Arab Army, they did not see it as a major obstacle. Although it was taken over by the Qaeda affiliated al-Nusra Front, for a battle hardened Hezbollah, they were nothing more than a rag-tag group of fanatics.

Therefore, in its internal assessment, Hezbollah calculated a 1 to 10 casualty of its fighters. After all it had successfully maintained 1 to 1 ratio with Israel even though the latter had much better firepower and logistical network.

However, when the battle to take back al-Qusayr started, Hezbollah suffered over 15 casualties just on the opening day. It not only shocked its leader Hassan Nasrallah, but left him perplexed too. With the help of its elaborate network of intelligence, by the next evening it was confirmed that some of the members of Hamas had passed on its tactics to the militants, the same tactics that Hezbollah and Iran passed on to Hamas in its struggle against Israel. Without resorting to panic, the commanders of Hezbollah quickly changed the tactics on the ground in between the battle and slowed the assault for a couple of days. What was in fact a calculated move appeared to be the untrained eyes as Hezbollah's failure to take the city “easily”. And especially so to the eyes of Lebanese leader Saad Hariri, who assured the world that Hezbollah will be “buried” in al-Qusayr.

When the dust settled, Hezbollah not only managed to liberate the city, the final casualty ratio for Hezbollah turned out to be near about 1 to 13, restoring not only the deterrent but sending a clear message that it is here to stay.

However, it did prove detrimental to Hezbollah-Hamas relationship. The trouble had started brewing a long time ago when Hamas its political leadership from Damascus to Doha along with its head Khaled Meshaal.

The choice of Doha as a place to shift was troublesome as it had become obvious by then that Qatar and Turkey under Erdogan were actively supporting militants in Syria. The shift was widely seen as a betrayal both in Tehran and Damascus, but Hezbollah refused to share its opinion. However,  al-Qusayr was a different ball game. One of the Hezbollah field commanders also maintained that its fighters in al-Qusayr found explosive devices and some tunnels dug by the Syrian militants that closely resembled those of friendly forces outside Syria, alluding to Hamas.

“It is important to note that Hamas’ decision to criticize Hezbollah comes despite the fact that opposing voices are present, such as Hamas political leader in Gaza Mahmoud al-Zahar. He said he wanted to maintain the relationship with Hezbollah and Iran despite their differences over the Syrian revolution. There is also information that Marwan Issa, the Hamas military commander, sent a message to Meshaal calling on him to maintain the relationship with Hezbollah and Iran for military considerations, since the Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, has no alternative logistical and military support,” says West Asia expert Adnan Abu Amer, who keeps an eye on Hamas-Hezbollah relations.

It is also being said in hushed up tone that Iran has refused to replenish the stockpile of Hamas rockets and that its new master, Qatar, is in no mood to assist the group in this matter.

The spillover effect is also being seen in Lebanon where Saudi supported Salafi groups have tried to give the conflict a sectarian colour by attacking Lebanese security forces and Shias. In Egypt, a Shia cleric and four others were lynched by Salafis this week. However, these attacks can not hide the clear sign of desperation that appears to have set in the opposition camp in Syria. The Qatari-Turkey program has started to give way. That the West rushed up to provide the militants with weapons is indicative of that. Also, Erdogan's administration has been rattled by the protests inside Turkey and he will now try to channelize resources to stabilize his shaky administration. The Qatari Emir not only had to abdicate but abdicate in an embarrassing way. On the other hand, the president-elect of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, has pledged his support to the Assad regime.

“It is not a secret that about 50 percent of Lebanese, including some Shiites, are dissatisfied with the military stance toward Israel that threatens their lives and homes and interests. The source offered that if Hezbollah’s position were sectarian based, it would respond to southern Lebanese Shiite fears of a new Israeli war by ending its resistance and reaching a permanent cease-fire with Israel,” says  Haytham Mouzahem, a Lebanese expert working for al-Monitor.
All this has left Lebanese Sunni Leader, Saad Hariri, in a tough position. He tried to use the opportunity by painting Hezbollah as a sectarian group but failed miserably. He also hoped that Hezbollah will find its Waterloo at al-Qusayr, but it did not happen. And that his and other Salafist  leaders' appeal to Sunnis to rise against Hezbollah found few takers, shows Hezbollah's appeal in Lebanon.

“Hariri knows that things have returned to square one, if not square zero, despite the reassurances of some of his aides and associates. The leader of the Future Movement realises this because there is a difference between the way the Syrian regime controls Syrian cities today, compared to two years ago: back then, the regime only maintained a formal hold on those cities, while throngs of militants were hiding underground; today, the Syrian army is both above and below the ground, while the militants are in heaven,” says Ghassan Saoud, a political expert based Beirut.

So, how will things shape up now? The Syrian Arab Army is all set to start its operation in Aleppo Governorate, a substantial part of which is in the opposition's control. However, unlike al-Qusayr, there will be no Hezbollah team assisting them. In many ways, Aleppo will be a decisive battle in the Syrian Conflict. If it falls, it will be almost impossible for the opposition to mount another serious challenge to the Syrian Arab Army.

The spillover effect of Syria is evident now. Erdogan looks shaky. Qatari Emir has reluctantly abdicated. Morsi is set to face further protests. There is also talk about a split between Hamas' military and political wings. The only person who looks indispensable, and most ironically so,  these days is Bashar al-Assad.