The kiss of death

 

 

The aftermath of truth

With no option being a non-option for the US, the trouble may have just begun for Musharraf, writes Rahul Pandita

If politics had an almanac, General Pervez Musharraf could have consulted it and charted his future course of action. But since there is no such thing, what Musharraf can do now is to ponder over the following words of the British Statesman, Benjamin Disraeli: “Something unpleasant is coming when men are anxious to tell the truth.” The truth in this case is a statement from Mike McConnell, the United States intelligence chief, that Osama bin Laden is alive and hiding in Pakistan. While McConnell blamed Musharraf’s government for allowing al-Qaeda to regroup on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, Bush’s homeland security adviser Fran Townsend said that the United States would consider military force to stem al-Qaeda’s growing ability in Pakistan.

These statements, coming from senior US officials, were met with sharp and angry reactions from Pakistan. Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri said that instead of intelligence estimates, America should provide “evidence” to Pakistan. But evidences are there – the biggest evidence, perhaps, being Pakistan military’s action in tribal areas, where it has killed scores of pro-Taliban militants. With militants scrapping a peace deal with the government after the Lal Masjid crackdown, violence has intensified in the tribal area of North Waziristan. General Musharraf has already lost around 600 soldiers in the military action in tribal areas. In the recent weeks, a number of suicide attacks on the Pakistani security forces have left more than 100 dead, most of them soldiers. On the political front, Musharraf lost another battle after the Supreme Court reinstated the sacked Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry.

There is no doubt that Musharraf is in trouble. Western intelligence agencies believe that the top al-Qaeda leadership, including bin-Laden and al-Zawahiri, has free access to some regions in Pakistan’s Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA). Sources have revealed that the US is constructing a large base in the Bajaur region on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The Pakistani Taliban leaders now fear that this base might be used to attack their strongholds in the entire region. The United States provides Musharraf with billions of dollars in military and economic assistance. In June, the State Department announced a five-year, $750 million counterterrorism initiative for the tribal areas, consisting of education, health, and sanitation projects – all aimed at winning over a largely hostile populace. But many experts believe that this funding will not be used for development. Says Stephen Cohen, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, and an expert on South Asian security, “The US needs to re-balance its aid so that more goes to developing the Pakistani educational system and the training of Pakistan’s political parties, and helping Pakistan move to a more balanced civil-military relationship; the Pakistan army also needs to learn how to do counterinsurgency, ironically the best example might be India.”

The question that everyone is asking now is whether Musharraf is losing ground in Pakistan. After a couple of assassination attempts in 2003, Musharraf is finding himself surrounded by a growing cadre of enemies. During the Lal Masjid standoff, an attempt was made to shoot down his plane from a residential rooftop. The police found two anti-aircraft batteries at the residence. Experts believe that this help, in terms of providing sophisticated arms and ammunition to extremists, is coming from certain elements within the Pakistani security establishment. They say that a radical shift in Pakistani policy after 9/11 has led to the formation of fissures inside the military apparatus. The Jihadi elements who had enjoyed Pakistan’s favour for years found themselves marginalized after 2001. “What is this? It’s nothing but the leftovers of the global Jihadi phenomenon in Pakistan,” says Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, a Pakistan-based security specialist.

So, is the United States looking for an alternative to General Musharraf? More importantly, does it really have an alternative? “The last thing the US wants to do is to be seen as the maker and breaker of Pakistani governments,” says Cohen. “We have to be supportive of Musharraf while urging him to share power with the moderate middle in Pakistan and change his policies; this is a very difficult task, and requires diplomacy of the highest order,” he adds. “The US doesn’t care a hoot about stability in Pakistan. It wants the chaos in Pakistan to increase so that it has a manufactured excuse to attack Pakistan. Pakistan is America’s final target in this war on terrorism,” says Samiullah Koreshi, the Political Editor of the Pakistan Observer.

As militants launch fresh attacks on Pakistani security forces in the tribal region along the Afghan border (militants are believed to have executed two paramilitary soldiers in Bajaur), the trouble may have just begun for Musharraf. With situation in Pakistan looking less stable by the day, and with no option being a non-option for the US, something unpleasant may be just round the corner for Musharraf, and perhaps, for Pakistan as well. After all, someone has just spoken the truth. And that too not one but many. Somebody’s war

Sleepless in NWFP

In the Bush-Musharraf-Taliban war, innocent people may have to bear the brunt

Farhat Taj Andersen

For decades Pakistan had armed and trained militant Islamists for a proxy war in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Now they believe they are at par with the State and can impose their will on the state and their version of Islam on the society in Pakistan. The Islamic militants have the support of international Islamic terrorists groups, especially al-Qaeda.

The Lal mosque operation is just the beginning of a seemingly long war that Pakistan would have to wage against the militants it nurtured. President Musharraf has announced to take tough action against all Madrassas, which are potential Lal masjids. This is an uphill task. One, it requires state control over syllabus and finances of the country’s Madrassas. Even before the 11 September attacks, President Musharraf tried and failed to regulate them. They rejected almost all the reforms aimed at their syllabus and finances. In the aftermath of the Lal mosque operation, it seems even more challenging to reform the Madrassas, because thousands of zealots are on the streets vowing to defend the seminaries from the government control. But without reforms, the Madrassas would continue to produce foot soldiers for Jihad. I had a long discussion with teachers and students of Jamia Hafsa, when I was allowed entrance. They vowed to enforce their version of Islam on the people of Pakistan and clash with the security forces of Pakistan, if they stopped them. They said they had been visited in their dreams by a crying Prophet Mohammad who asked them to fight for Islam. They realised their words by kidnapping people whom they accused of ‘immorality’, and, by occupying state buildings and clashing with the Pakistani soldiers. There are others upholding such views. Two, Pakistan would have to disarm the militants. The Lal mosque operation shows it is a difficult task, especially in the tribal belt, where the militants have bases. According to one rumour rife in the North West Frontier Province, NWFP, the militants have vowed to kill as many security personnel as the Islamists killed in Lal Masjid, which according the militants are more than 1000, but as per the government, 102. Security officers and civilians are under attack, especially in the NWFP and the tribal area. The militants are employing al-Qaeda like tactics from Iraq and Afghanistan. Besides suicide bombing, explosive cars are being used to inflict maximum damage. The militants are better armed than the police and Khasadars, the tribal force policing the tribal areas on behalf of the State. Resultantly, they have infiltrated into the settled districts adjacent to the tribal areas to terrorize the people by bombing music shops, girls’ schools, barber shops and mosques.

Still, people in the NWFP are resisting the militants in whatever ways possible. A principal in Tank district foiled the militants’ attempt to kidnap boys for Jihad from his school by calling the police. In the ensuing battle, the militants were killed and two policemen lost their lives. The militants later kidnapped the principal. Despite threats, many parents continue to send their girls to schools and their teachers continue to teach them. Militants in Bajaur area have declared that it is un-Islamic to vaccinate children against the polio. Yet medical workers go house to house to vaccinate children. The US has openly expressed is desire to bomb the militants in Pakistan. This is disturbing for the people of Pakistan. Culturally, it is not easy for an attacking US force to tell an Islamic militant apart from an innocent citizen.

Even the foreign Islamic militants have adopted the local Pushtun manners, and they live among the local people. The fear is that the US would massacre innocent people and justify it as ‘collateral damage’. The Islamic militants have their own ideology of the ‘collateral damage’. One militant explained: “We don’t intend to kill innocent people. However, it is no despair that innocent people are killed in our attacks. If they are innocent, God will forgive their sins and reward them with a place in paradise. They must be lucky and their families must be happy about it.” In short, it seems that in the aftermath of the Lal Mosque Operation, the State and society in Pakistan have entered into a painful confrontation with militants. An Ace up his

Sleeves

As Musharraf’s options are limited, the world waits for a masterstroke, writes Saurabh Kumar Shahi

Only seven minutes of fuel was left in the PIA plane that landed in Karachi on the fateful day which altered the course of Pakistan’s history. Facing death, Musharraf held his nerve, and, in a masterstroke, changed the political contours of Pakistan. Referring to it in his autobiography, Musharraf boasted that he becomes more articulate when he faces death. Today, after eight eventful years, he again finds himself in the same situation; albeit less grave. He faces his political death, and the time is running out for him. The world waits for a maste stroke.

Practically speaking, Musharraf has only three options on the table. The first one, which seems most likely, is that he gets himself re-elected by the present assembly. But there is a problem there. “Mandate for the office of the President should come from the new elected assemblies and not from the assemblies which have outlived their terms or are about to reach the end of their term. It is like writing a cheque by a person going bankrupt after signing it,” quips Rashid Ali Khan, Senior Political Analyst, Associated Press, Pakistan. If that scenario emerges, parties like the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) and Tehreek-e-Insaaf will fight it out in the Supreme Court, which, after its Iftikhar verdict, looks set to quash anything that reeks of constitutional overreach.

The second option would be to contest the upcoming elections. But of all the attributes of Musharraf, nobody ever claimed that he is a fool. Contesting elections will mean a rout for PML faction supporting Musharraf. The Islamists and lower middle-class will vote en masse against Musharraf. The upwardly mobile, largely secular upper and upper middle class that supports Musharraf’s action will be happier spending holiday in their mansions in ‘Clifton’ and ‘Defence’ than standing in the queue to vote. If Musharraf is compelled, he will go for rigging of intensity unheard of in the democratic world. Sources in Pakistan have told TSI that Musharraf is already up to his cunning best and has already tampered with as many as 20 million names in the electoral rolls.

The third and the last option for him is to strike an electoral alliance with one of the mainstream parties and then go for the polls. In that scenario, we can cross out Imran Khan and PML (Nawaz). The only one left is Benazir Bhutto. In the past, Musharraf has tried to cozy up with Bhutto, but things have not worked in a way Musharraf wanted them to. And moreover, things are not good for Benazir either. “Two things go against Benazir: her soft corner for Salman Rushdie and that she is more pliant to dictation from foreign powers. There are more chances of liberal voters opting for Imran Khan instead,” says Sheikh Mutahir Ahmed, noted analyst from the University of Karachi. Tough luck! Musharraf must make a choice soon. As Musharraf plans to battle it out, the irony is that he seems the best choice. Paying the price

Mistakes of the past

Pakistan should brace for one of the most violent periods in its recent history

Moeed Yusuf



The extremist backlash in the wake of the Lal Masjid operation in Pakistan and the subsequent US National Intelligence Estimate’s claim that al-Qaeda elements were resurging in the country have heightened fears of the country’s further decline towards instability. A ‘Talibanized’ Pakistan is being presented as a realistic possibility.

Fortunately, a structured analysis of the situation paints a relatively optimistic picture. Consider that for a still-functional State to undergo a radical ideological change, one of two scenarios has to be realised. Either, a prolonged period of ideologically driven violence in the face of a State’s inability or unwillingness to tackle the radical elements could allow them to forcibly establish control. Alternatively, radical elements could permeate their message into the society, a large majority of which chooses to support the ideology as one that ought to be adopted by the State.

Neither of the above holds in Pakistan’s case. The State authorities have been left with no choice but to act decisively against the extremist cadres. Events since the Lal Masjid operation ought to have laid to rest any suspicion about the State’s involvement in extremist activities. The reaction of the extremist elements clearly suggests that they do not consider the military or the State at large as partners in fulfilling their agenda. The mood vis-à-vis the military is obvious from the fact that army personnel and related infrastructure has been the principal target of retaliation. But could the State still find it prudent to turn a blind eye towards the extremist backlash? Had the militant reaction not been so obviously targeted at challenging the State’s writ, the authorities may well have resisted the urge to act wholeheartedly. Indeed, this is the policy Pakistani authorities have followed in the past, an inherently myopic approach that has gradually emboldened the extremists and allowed them to stand up to the State authority. Notwithstanding the above, the highly exaggerated and narrowly targeted reaction from the extremist enclave has left no option for the State but to act. Any signs of retreat at this point would signal weakness and embolden the extremists further. Moreover, in the face of intense pressure, inaction may prove untenable. In a rare occurrence, the state of affairs has prompted the country’s two most influential enclaves — the military and the urban elite — to simultaneously pressure the State. While for the military, its self-created image of an invincible force is at stake, the urban elite, for the first time, have had to bear the brunt of extremist violence directly. The imminence of the threat on their doorsteps has created a remarkable sense of urgency. Given the clout of these two enclaves, the State will have to concur.

The second route for a State’s ideological transformation- permeating the society with a radical message-is also an impossibility in the Pakistani context. The average Pakistani is more fearful, than supportive of these extremist cadres. An 85 percent approval rating for the government’s action against Lal Masjid and the military’s continuing respect for institutional supremacy rather than ideological fixations are all pertinent examples of support for moderation in the society.

In essence, the divorce between the State and the extremist cadres is established. The military is likely to pursue an anti-extremist agenda more aggressively than ever before. However, this should not be construed as suggesting that a ruthless military action is imminent. The State will still try to minimize the need for military force, using both coercive and appeasement tactics as much as possible. In the final outcome, the amount of military force used would be a function of the type of reaction from the militants. Realistically, given the mood of the militants and despite the fact that intelligence agencies have permeated these outfits for some time, the likelihood of avoiding a violent backlash is low. Indeed, the State has allowed extremist cadres to remain active for long enough that no peaceful solution seems viable at this point.

In the near term future, Pakistan should brace for one of the most violent periods in its recent history. Not to be conflated with the possibility of Talibanization, this is the price Pakistan has to pay for years of accommodating these extremist cadres. The key would be to avoid past mistakes and extend this drive to its logical end. Cleaning the

backyards

India cannot escape from what is happening in its neighbourhood

In her controversial book Lajja, author Taslima Nasrin had said that “fanatics” in India are still under the illusion that it is a Jambudweep (isolated and self-dependent state) that remains largely unaffected from the turmoil that engulfs its neighbours. Well, never have her words rung truer as they do now. Moreover, as any strategic stalwart worth his salt would tell you: India’s security, somehow, has always been attached, as if with an umbilical cord, with the events unfolding in its neighbouring countries. And the truth is that India doesn’t have much control over such events. While who comes out unscathed in the fight between Musharraf and Islamists is key to India’s security, it is also true that similar conflicts in neighbouring Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka will also affect the scenario considerably.

Take Bangladesh for example. The tussle between Sheikh Hasina and the military administration will decide how much force and resources India will have to canalise to its eastern realm to get a sound sleep. Noted security analyst from Bangladesh, Prof. Ataur Rahman, believes that organisations like the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) are not only a threat to the Indian security but to the civil society of Bangladesh itself.

The situation in neighbouring Sri Lanka is volatile too. The complete failure of Oslo accord looms large as the government readies itself for the Armageddon. India, due to its past mistake, will be dragged to the conflict willy-nilly. Hussain Bhaila, Deputy Foreign Minister in Colombo’s foreign office, quips, “India is a great friend of Sri Lanka. It has always cooperated with us. Even now, it has an important role to play. India must use its good offices to get the LTTE at the negotiating table.” India seems to have completely lost the plot here. Worse, it can remain impartial at its own peril. Pakistan will be visibly delighted to send one of its frigates stationed in Karachi straight into India’s backyard.

And if that was not enough, Nepal is proving to be another diplomatic Chernobyl for India. Maoists, who are at the helm of affairs now, have not forgotten India’s hobnob with Gyanendra. Nepal watchers believe that the Maoists will, one day, engage India. It is also clear that Nepal will like to undermine India’s interest for its Communist neighbours. India, on the other hand, is busy in assisting Madhesis, though privately, instead of mending fence. In short, India sits on a powder keg. If only India were a Jambudweep. Gearing up For you, Ever ready

India must remain prepared for Pakistan, with or without Musharraf

Brig. (Retd.)

Rajiv Williams

Will democracy in Pakistan ever return in its true form? Will General Pervez Musharraf permit the democratic forces to operate, and will the elections scheduled for October 2007 be held in a fair and free atmosphere? These are some of the inquisitions of the people of Pakistan as they discuss various options. With the elections due in just a little over three months and with the five years period of the President coming to an end, there is speculation of Musharraf holding on to the mantle by use of force and having himself elected before the dissolution of the National Assembly. The President may invoke the provisions provided in the Constitution for such a possibility, alternatively he may postpone the elections. What is important is his survival and therefore the need to analyse the colour of democracy in Pakistan.

Despite the revival of democracy from time to time, it is predictably held in suspicion and there are innumerous instances when the civilian government has succumbed to military rule as it tried to legitimise itself with unfinished agendas, leaving the art of governance in disrepute and decay. One of the major tenets of civil society is the concept of a legitimate opposition, which has neither found favour with the political elites nor with the public. This has made Pakistan a crucible for determining whether extensions of democratic practices are likely to succeed or whether militant Islamic parties are likely to be moderated when given adequate space.

With that as a backdrop, it is important to analyse the players in the game which include some of the major political parties in the fray. Coining the process as the ‘Charter for Democracy’ there have been reports of a dialogue between Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Nawaz Sharief in 2006. With passage of time there has been a sudden change of tack and reports surfaced of Gen. Musharraf trying to woo Ms. Bhutto in a dialogue by which she may render conditional support to the General’s election for another term. Frankly, I often wonder whether the cadres of the opposition parties can really mobilize a common agenda and garner support for each other as the electioneering process approaches. ‘Operation Silence’ launched to flush out the terrorists from Lal Masjid is significant in terms of the military’s decision to eliminate the terrorists it had created itself. It is a significant message in the nation’s history by which the army has not only tried to establish the writ of the State but has warned all terrorists.

In the view of one analyst, the manner in which the Lal Masjid crisis was handled will discourage terrorists from challenging the State and the fact that no one really came out on the streets to mourn the death of Abdul Rashid Ghazi is a pointer toward this conjecture. However, there are others like the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amaal, and Qazi Hussain Ahmed, Jamaat-i-Islami Chief, who recently criticised government action.

Despite the above, geopolitics of the Region suggest that a regime change at this stage may not be good for the Region and America, with all its noise of Musharraf’s inadequacies in tackling terror, is actually quite happy with the present system. What is a bit worrisome is the politico–military–terrorist situation at a time when the terrorist organizational machineries are operating from Pakistan, and the recent curbs imposed on their freedom in mainland Pakistan, has made the terrorists suspicious of the General’s intentions. The General will have to balance out his actions in mainland Pakistan and in the tribal areas, as America now threatens to strike the hideouts in the FATA Region. Gen Musharraf has to walk the tight rope rather cautiously as he needs the support of the terrorists in winning the elections. What will be India’s stand during the entire process and will it gain from a status quo regime? Will there be a change in the overall security situation in the region? Will terrorism take a new shape in the coming months? Such questions will remain unanswered till the ballot is cast, but the pundits who are responsible for managing the affairs of the State, need to introspect and predict the conditions with or without Musharraf and frame suitable and adequate responses to ensure stability in the region. Open secret No change of Guard

Musharraf may go, but the army is there to stay in Pakistan

Salman Haider



Talking of Post-Musharraf scenario in Pakistan and its effect on the bilateral ties with India, one must understand that Musharraf or no Musharraf, the army is there to stay. This is a reality and it will be better if India gets it straight and clear, as soon as possible. Even if Musharraf is removed, there are chances that he will be replaced by some or the other General. Therefore, we do not have a choice. We will have to deal with the army, in one way or another, in the process of dealing with Pakistan. As for Musharraf, one can say that he started very badly. He was, and is continued to be seen as the architect and facilitator of Kargil conflict. Although he claims that Nawaz Sharief was taken into confidence, many believe that he went completely on his own.

Nevertheless, he started sending feelers to India as he strengthened his hold on the bureaucracy. He gave a different platform to Indo-Pak conflict resolution talks. He started looking at the Kashmir issue in a completely different light. He moved from the rigid position that Pakistan had on Kashmir in the past, to a more realistic one. On several occasions, he caught Indian officials off the guard by his out of the box proposals. Suddenly, Pakistani officials were no more talking about UN-monitored plebiscite on Kashmir and were giving serious thoughts to other options. Bilateral talks were favoured to tripartite talks.

In my view, two important steps signify Musharraf’s goodwill overtures towards India. The first and foremost is the ceasefire in Kashmir. The ceasefire has made the real difference and has certainly restored hope. The second is the bus-service between Srinagar and Muzaffarbad, in which Musharraf had a special interest. Some people claim that Musharraf is more interested in rhetoric and less in conflict resolution as he has offered most of the resolutions through media. In many cases, these were refuted by the Indian officials. Many people have expressed surprise over his “un-diplomatic” manners but one must understand that Musharraf is an ‘armyman’ and thus favours a straight forward manner of approach. It is not that India is not working on those suggestions but ours is a democratic set-up and thus we can not afford a dialogue through media. All these will suffer if Musharraf had to go. But first the question arises; would Musharraf go? In my view, it is highly unlikely. Musharraf is worried about the prospects of PML and MQM that support him. Therefore, he will try to re-elect himself through the current assembly. In that scenario, he is there for next five years and peace talks would continue as usual. If the Supreme Court quashes his re-elections; other parties might come to power. Now, it will be outlandish to think that these parties with the exception of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) will reverse the process. Yes, the conflict resolution process will slow down a bit which actually had in last six months as Musharraf lost much of his grip in the country. These parties will try to appease factions that have a soft corner for extremist elements and will not give a second thought before shelving some of the key terms of the deal. Demilitarization and joint management will be the first to fall but the process itself might survive. If Musharraf wins, then he will take on the conflict resolution process with a new vigour. In that case, we can expect more out of the box ideas for the resolution.

As for Musharraf’s claim that he has significantly clamped the infiltrations in Kashmir; I can say that, yes, there has been a considerable fall in the infiltration and even the officials from the MEA and the Home Ministry second that claim, but it is also true that MEA has time and again asked Musharraf to deliver more. I think, Musharraf has been honest in his approach in that respect and has categorically asked intelligence agencies to go slow on their help to infiltrators, but it is equally true that there are organisations and individual alike who are out of his sphere of influence and thus cannot be controlled without the use of force. These groups might get an upper hand in the scenario where Musharraf is replaced by a government that has the support of fringe groups such as MMA. And that is what we need to ponder upon.