Soldiers of a lesser god

Besides being pressed into an array of onerous security operations, they take on the Maoists in some of India’s toughest terrains and sustain high losses of life and limb in the bargain. What do personnel of the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) get in return for their bravery? Woefully short shrift from a system that gives a damn.  

It is not just on the battlefield that these soldiers lay down their lives for an ingrate nation. Data suggests that the number of CAPF jawans who die in action is markedly small against those that fall prey to disease, stress and suicide (see box). In the first three months of 2012, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) has seen 128 deaths. While 29 jawans died in the line of duty, heart attacks accounted for 99 jawans. That apart, 28 died of AIDS, 14 of alcoholism, 52 due to cancer, and 10 of hypertension. 42 CRPF men also committed suicide during this period.

No wonder the CAPF is facing a massive spate of resignations, a serious qualitative deterioration in the officers’ cadre and mounting de-motivation in the ranks. A closer scrutiny reveals a sordid tale of confusion, apathy and mismanagement on the part of the policy makers.

Two IIMs, the ones at Lucknow and Ahmedabad, were recently commissioned by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) to assess the health of the paramilitary forces. Their findings are alarming. TSI is also in possession of a report by the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) that has been brushed under the carpet. All three reports repeatedly underline several grave problems in the administration of the CAPF.

For one, the reports state, the forces suffer from a lack of a well-defined mandate. “There is no clear identity of the force. They are performing army-like duties as well as police duties. However, neither the internal organisation nor the general public is clear about the identity of the paramilitary forces,” IIM Ahmedabad says of the Border Security Force (BSF).

Indeed, CAPF are trapped in a undefined zone between the police and the army. They have none of the authority and privileges that former. Neither do they have an indigenous organisation or a specific role to play like the latter. There is also great confusion regarding the jurisdiction of the various forces that constitute CAPF: besides CRPF and BSF, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), the Shasastra Seema Bal (SSB), and the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF).

The CRPF, for example, is responsible for law and order, counter-insurgency, road-opening and static duties, apart from election deployment, VIP security, manning of important installations and dealing with Left wing extremism. But ITBP, BSF, CISF and SSB have similar responsibilities with overlapping mandates, which clearly leave a huge disparity in the kind of training that is imparted at various establishments and the final role that the jawans play. This, in part, is responsible for the confusion that reigns supreme.

This confusion is, however, only a minor factor. The biggest worry is the rampant disaffection among jawans and officers alike. CAPF officers serve under conditions that are sub-human, to say the least. In the Army, it is a norm to rotate soldiers regularly, with three years of active field duty and three years of “soft” or peace posting. For the CAPF, the norm is an extraordinarily long nine years. Even then, more often than not, there is no peace posting. Spending such long periods under the tremendous stress of the frontline is bound to fray the nerves of the strongest of men, leading to suicides, fratricides, cases of alcoholism, hypertension and heart attacks. "It all depends on leadership. The worst was in Kashmir, where the stress was enormous," says EN Rammohan, former DG, BSF.

The extent of the insensitivity is not confined to just hard areas where the forces' personnel are deployed. The glaring example is the living conditions of the jawans of the elite 39th Battalion of ITBP which is entrusted with the security of the president and his estate. Stationed in a comparatively more comfortable, urban area in Greater Noida, the infrastructure provided for the jawans is appalling. The headquarters building is a tin-roofed shed and canvas tents pass for living accommodation.

Needless to say, the tents provide little protection from the rains or the Delhi cold. Such living conditions no doubt take a toll of the health of the soldiers. What the conditions might be in harder terrain like Maoist-infested jungles and the high altitude areas of Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh simply boggles the imagination.
Other support systems are equally poor. The condition of the medical teams deployed with the forces is pitiable. Not that the men who staff the medical facility are inept. But the training they receive and the tools they work with hardly ensure a high level of performance. Says a CAPF doctor: “Expansion of every force is going on in the adhoc training facilities with inadequate trainers and instructors.” Officers reveal that in 2011, ITBP had 185 doctors, a shortfall of 125 doctors. Similarly, the BSF is short of 210 doctors whilr the CRPF needs 183 medical personnel. There is neither departmental support to improve skills and knowledge nor are the service conditions congenial.

Then there is the question of promotions.  A 1984 batch officer in SSB got promoted to the Inspector-General (IG) level only in 2009. The same batch will see its first officer becoming an IG in CRPF in October this year while BFS officers have to wait four more years. In stark contrast, an IPS officer is likely to become a Deputy Inspector General by 13 years while according to the latest army policy, an officer who has served that long will have been promoted to the rank of full colonel. The situation is equally bad at the lower levels. Jawans have remained constables for as long as 20 years. Doubtless, this leads to frustration and a sense of stagnation.
True to form, policy makers have resorted to regressive steps to even out the odds. While there is stagnation in the BSF and CRPF, the situation in ITBP was slightly better till July this year.  ITBP officers were eligible for the rank of Commandant and could head units after serving two years as second in command. But after a gazzette of India notification in July, they will have to wait for five years. Even if the officers do receive timely promotions, an unintelligible policy of the MHA states that no cadre officer of CAPF can ever go on to lead the force unless he is an IPS officer. The highest that a cadre officer can go up to is second in command. In fact, even apart from the top man, most high-ranking officers are also from the IPS cadre. 

As a result, it is a force where the leadership is completely disconnected from the ground realities of the soldier on the field. Taking cognizance of this fact, the IDSA report says: “The most pertinent point that emerges from the interactions is that those performing these duties felt a complete lack of support from the senior officers and the centre.”

Are the cadre officers incapable of commanding? In this country itself, the Coast Guard is largely manned by its own staff. In fact, while more often than not, the top official there as well is a Navy officer, there have been three separate occasions when it has been led by a cadre officer. IIM Lucknow goes on to suggest that a “fully indigenous cadre of officers to man the force” be formed. TSI sources suggest that the researchers are under pressure to remove this recommendation. On the condition of anonymity, an IPS officer has stated that even if they continue to lead the CAPF, the IPS officers should take the bull by its horns and accept responsibility for the sorry state of affairs.

When it comes to welfare measures for the officers, there is not much to speak of. There is little education support for the children, family accommodation or medical support. With 90 per cent of the force deployed in operational locations, this becomes a huge problem. Also, CAPF has no provisions for short stints. CAPF personnel come under contributory pension scheme where they pay for their pensions with an equal share coming from the government.

The Armed Forces have the Directorate of Re-settlement, which trains its officers and soldiers in skills which help them get jobs or start businesses post-retirement.  Further, there are NGOs like the Indian Ex-Servicemen League, Ex-Servicemen League and War Veterans Foundations along with the Sainik Boards in every district. Nothing of that kind is in place for  CAPF jawans. The IIM Lucknow report  recommends a “policy of resettlement of officers and other ranks, post retirement”. There has been nothing so far. Small wonder then that CAPF is understaffed and is fast being considered as the last refuge of people unable make it into any other of the forces in the country.

To handle the lack of officers, IIM Lucknow suggests a policy of providing study leaves and deputation to other organisations. Nothing of the sort has happened yet. MHA has begun to take a few steps. Letters to requisition reports from every unit about the steps taken to bring the stress down have been requisitioned. A 200-bed super speciality hospital is being constructed in Greater Noida and a 800- bed hospital is being built in Tughlaqabad. While the idea of hospitals on the lines of the Research and Referral and Base Hospital of the Armed Forces is welcome, existing setups that could have been amalgamated to make a bigger one, using the shared resources more efficiently, have been neglected.

Recently, Defence Minister AK Antony and the chiefs of Army, Air Force and Navy took serious note of the average of 100 suicides taking place in the 13 lakh-strong Armed Forces and sent precise orders to curb it. However, when seen in contrast to the average of more than 150 suicides that take place in the 6 lakh-strong paramilitary forces, the Armed Forces numbers look almost acceptable.

There is nobody to stand up for the rights of  CAPF. Clearly, MHA policy makers are either completely apathetic or incapable of taking care of this force that is so vital to the internal security of the nation. Until this step-motherly attitude changes, the paramilitary forces are looking down the barrel of a gun.

mayank.singh@thesundayindian.com