Quid pro quo, russia style!

 

 

Last week Washington decided to abandon a high-priced and untried missile shield, approved by the Bush regime days after Russian forces walked into Georgia last year. And even though President Obama scarcely cited it, his decision vis-à-vis the land-based anti-ICBM system pulled out the single biggest thorn in the side of Russia-America ties. Washington now vouches for smaller but tested defence systems, positioned to intercept short and mid-range Iranian missiles. The previous Bush regime had unsuccessfully and unconvincingly argued that the projected radar in the Czech Republic and interceptor missiles in Poland were essential to protect against the risk of long-range Iranian missiles, probably carrying nuclear warheads.

As expected, the Republicans are up in arms and criticising Obama ostensibly for “appeasing Russia and abandoning Poland”. But as things stand, the majority of European officials are openly approving the decision. German diplomats and their counterparts in Paris perceive the White House shift as altering a US policy forced singularly on Europe – and agreeing to bigger running room with Moscow on issues from Iran to North Korea, Afghanistan and nuclear proliferation, of which Russia is an integral part.

“The original plan was a classic example of hodgepodge planning. It had to go. Having said that one must find out whether Obama is doing this from a position of strength or weakness,” Alexander Rahr, an expert on Russia-Eastern Europe relations at the German Council of Foreign Relations, said in a conversation with TSI. “I know I am sounding like a cynic from the 19th century. But the fact is I am just being rational.”

If that be the case, the mood of European diplomatic circles is quite understandable. They had been doubtful of the missile shield for quite a few reasons. Experts had all along contended that it was technically questionable and did not guard Europe. They had argued that it was primarily intended to stop ICBMs destined for the US, that it was exorbitantly high-priced, that it was forced on Europe without proper discussions, and that it offered Moscow a subject to reasonably or unreasonably fret over.

It was hardly surprising therefore that a survey by the most popular Polish daily, done hours after the decision was made, clearly suggested that more than 50 per cent of the Poles strongly agreed with Obama's choice to discard the missile shield, while merely 31 per cent varied. Several experts and analysts now suggest that Poland and the Czech Republic will now have to negotiate their security with other European regimes along with NATO—of which they are members—and not in an “extraordinary relationship” with Washington. However, this may well prove practical in the long term.

It would be immature (and dishonest) to wait for an explicit quid pro quo from Russia, and the one issue where the US has the maximum expectation of reciprocation - Iran - is not likely to yield a lot. Even though Russia unquestionably recognises that a nuclear Iran would alter the strategic equilibrium in the region, the Kremlin most certainly does not find the vista to be as catastrophic as Israel and its ally US do. And above all, Russia has at all times overtly declined to link the missile shield with the Iranian question.

A number of right-wing critics suggest that the US president has vastly undermined American allies in Europe; as also its own reliability as a tough taskmaster. They doubt that Obama will succeed in ensuring that a resurgent Russia doesn’t once again aspire to dictate its previous Soviet-era satellites. However, the doves maintain that it might well help Obama “reset” relations with Moscow, perk up chances for a fresh strategic arms limitation treaty to reinstate Start 1, which runs out in December, and make progress in attempting to cut back Iran through the UN.