The snuffing out of Osama bin Laden has sparked a debate: has the time come for the US and NATO to quit war-ravaged Afghanistan? The US and Western forces that illegally occupied the impoverished Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks on the ground of punishing the Taliban, accused of giving shelter to the conspirators: al Qaeda chief and others, have been toying with the idea of a pull out from some time.
But till now they have not executed any such plan as they know that nine years low intensity conflict in the landlocked Afghanistan has brought a lot of changes in the Geopolitics with many innocent civilians, including children, being killed in the War on Terror (WOT) that the US always claimed as collateral damage. The US ferocious onslaught on Afghanistan has turned out to be a successful one with the Taliban and al Qaeda lying in tatters. Most of their leaders are languishing in Guantanamo Bay detention camp or dead. A few who have survived the day-to-day US Drone attacks in Pakistan are on the run.
The death of the most wanted man can be touted as a big achievement for the US and it has the potential to jolt the Taliban and al Qaeda. But still it is too early to write these outfits off. The killing has already convinced many Americans that the time is ripe for a pull out. A Utah Republican Rep. Jason Chaffetz and Rep. Barney Frank, a liberal Massachusetts Democrat, have called for pulling back US troops. In an article published in The Salt Lake Tribune (Is it time for U.S. To pull out of Afghanistan? May 17, 2011), Frank said: “We went there to get Osama bin Laden and we have now gotten Osama bin Laden.” Even there are many inside Barack Obama's administration who strongly feel that the withdrawal of US troops that is to begin this summer should be bigger and faster.
Since the embarrassment in Vietnam (1973), the US has successfully adopted innovative tactics of crushing the insurgents and moving out of the conflict zone by raising local forces. Though in Iraq, the American army is no more involved in day to day fighting, but it continues to be stationed in strategic positions to monitor Iran movement and control oil flow. In Afghanistan, the situation is different as insurgency is yet to be crippled.
Like Russia (formerly USSR), the Americans know that camping in Afghanistan for long could create problems for them. Chances of them getting sucked into the internal conflict are high as it happened to the USSR who were forced to desert the country in late 1980s. That loss was a big blow to the then super power as the rag-tag but highly motivated Mujahideen chased them out of their country after nearly ten years of brutal war that claimed lives of many Afghanistani civilians and children.
This is not to say that US like USSR will also run away from Afghanistan. For now the Obama administration has decided for a token cut of about 2,000 of the 100,000 US troops stationed in Afghanistan. There is no full pull out.
Some in the Americans and NATO forces agree with Afghanistan president Hamid Karzai, who fears that a pull out may further give Taliban a boost. Karzai wants the Americans to put stay until the Taliban are wholly finished and their safe havens in Pakistan bust. Even India wants the US to slow down its pull out plan from Afghanistan. According to an article published in Pakistan-based The News online, U.S. diplomatic cables originating from Islamabad and New Delhi, accessed by India-based The Hindu through WikiLeaks, clearly suggest that India was concerned about U.S. plans to exit from Afghanistan, and its possible repercussions on India's security.
Smoking out the insurgents will be an arduous and complex task. As hardened fighters, Afghans are fiercely independent people, who hate being ruled by foreigners. The terrain too is inhospitable for outsiders. Unlike Iraq (where the US succeeded after a bloodbath), the civil society is non-existent in Afghanistan. All these combined together make it difficult for a foreign force to rule Afghanistan for long. The Soviet Union and Britain found it the hard way. The Americans know this very well.
Without Pakistan's help nothing can be done. That is why the Americans have adopted a carrot and stick policy towards Pakistanis and is eager to find a solution to this burning problem. Strategists know that a quick and positive success can only come when rogue elements in Pakistan's army and ISI stop sheltering the runaway Taliban. With Pakistan half-heartedly addressing this issue, things are becoming difficult for the Karzai government and the Americans.
A large section of army men and ISI agents in Pakistan feel that the end of Taliban means they would loose their strategic depth in Afghanistan. And at the same time, the flow of dollars in shape of aids will also dry up that is needed the most to rev up the ailing Pakistan economy. On the other hand, there are some rogue elements and Islamists who want the US to stay for long and get dragged into the internal conflict. They strongly feel that like USSR, the Americans could also be nailed down in Afghanistan. A lot could change if in five years time China emerges as a big Boss and US is restrained from Drone attacks and hunt operation deep into Pakistan territory. If this happens then the insurgents, including the Taliban, will get enough time to reorganise and rearm them after hurting the US in Afghanistan. This strategy was successfully used by Pakistan and America against the USSR that had failed to chase the Mujahideens in Pakistan and destroy their bases.
Right now it is the advantage of America with Pakistan feeling the heat. And with India too in Afghanistan, chances are that Pakistan-which has for the first time in its history an enemy sitting pretty on its eastern front-will not give up easily. It is a long and complex war for the US and NATO.
This summer would be a decisive one as the US army prepares for a decisive onslaught on Taliban forces. With the top leaders scattered, will the Taliban fighters "run here and there like headless chickens" as they did in 2001 or fight back?
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in the blog are that of the author and does not necessarily represent the editorial policy of The Sunday Indian.)