Karzai plays king's gambit

 

 

In the recently held, and appropriately named, Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore—which was called to discuss Afghanistan—Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov could not hide his pleasure while noting that soon NATO will beat the Soviet record of being in Afghanistan for ten years. Mercifully for his counterparts, his chuckles did not turn into a full-blown laughter. One should have looked at the face of Robert Gates. It aptly explained the American quagmire in Afghanistan.

While the US administration maintains that it is making strides in countering the impulse built up by the Taliban insurrection over the last decade, the news on ground from Afghanistan indicates that the contrary might be much closer to the reality. Even senior military officials on ground have lately started conceding in private that their much hyped and discussed new counter-insurgency plan of action of “clear, hold and build” in restive areas of the Pashtun southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan are way off target and under-productive, the “surge” of some 20,000 additional US troops notwithstanding.

Such are the results that even Secretary of Defence Robert Gates has caught a cold feet and has admitted publicly that time is running out for American and NATO troops to show results. “The one thing none of the (alliance's) publics...including the American public, will tolerate is the perception of stalemate in which we're losing young men,” he was reported as saying in London. His role at the key NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels this week, at which Afghanistan will rule the discussion and Gates himself is all set to urge his interlocutors to carry out pledges to render additional troops, will be anything but easy. Naturally, Hamid Karzai has decided to take matters into his own hands.

However, disenchantment with President Hamid Karzai –by now at its peak because of last year's botched elections and his turning a blind eye towards administrative and family corruption – increased last week with the forced ouster of his two top security officials, Interior Minister Hanif Atmar and Intelligence Chief Amrullah Saleh, who have been hailed by NATO officials as the “most competent cabinet members.” The two men apparently disapproved of Karzai's diktat to let go all accused Taliban prisoners who are being held without adequate grounds for trials. The diktat was being looked upon as the latest in an order of moves designed to conciliate the Taliban leadership, a move that Washington disapproves of. “The reason behind this move is the cold reception Karzai received from the American administration during his last visit to US. It has made him feel vulnerable,” says Ahmed Ali Jalali, Afghanistan's former Interior Minister and now an expert at the National Defence University in Washington, while talking to TSI. “Karzai is looking out for new networks and allies fearing premature withdrawal of troops.”

So what does these survival gestures mean? Karzai's call for rapprochement stems from his strong belief—as I am told by several security officials working in Afghanistan—that US plan of action is far-fetched to deliver the goods in weakening –let alone defeating –the Taliban, and that sway on the nation will at long last bank on reaching a settlement with them. This notion may well be footed in a precise appraisal of the way Washington's counterinsurgency scheme is in reality playing out. The insecurity has left Karzai alternately whipping out in wrath and looking for new allies, turning to Iran and factions within the Taliban—both antacid to American designs. Apart from the usual fallouts, Washington fears that reckless decisions on Karzai's part might push warlords and leaders of the Northern Alliance, that comprises various non-Pashtun tribes, to part ways with the regime and machinate for renewed civil war.

It was not that Karzai did not look out for what West would like to believe as better options. But his plans never took off. Everything said and done, any Afghanistan watcher worth his salt can tell you that Afghan intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh, who was ceremonially shown the door by Karzai and who was in good-books of Western officials, was actually a long-time CIA contact man who helped the agency in various capacities from as early as 1990. Also, his apparent hatred for Pakistan was well known and most of Karzai's barbs against Pakistan were actually his words. Together, Saleh and Karzai tried to convene the Jirga in January. According to the original plan, it would have included Mullah Baradur, Taliban's No. 2, who, as I am told by close sources, had previously indulged in secret contacts with Karzai and the UN. However, as things turned out, in the following month, ISI spoilt the game by arresting Baradur. Needless to say, both Karzai and Saleh were crestfallen.

“His arrest was widely seen as a move by Islamabad to aver sway over the Afghan peace process, a communication to Karzai that his endeavours would miscarry unless they brought Pakistan into the nerve centre of the talks,” says Robert Dreyfuss, a Taliban expert and a writer, while talking to TSI.

So, the new Jirga took care of such insecurities and went on to take some encouraging decisions. It agreed to set up a abiding Shoora, or council, to look into the commencement of peace dialogues, and it’s possible that present or erstwhile units of the Taliban could participate in the talks. Jirga also asked Taliban to sever ties with al Qaeda, a request meant to assuage the US. Apart from demanding the removal of the UN blacklist, it also requested for the release of prisoners held by the US in Guantánamo and at Bagram Air Base and other prisons.

Everything went on as planned by Karzai.

Although Karzai may have entered office as a charismatic, competent leader, over the last few years he has grown marooned. And, with the US talk of withdrawing next summer, Karzai is readying for his future, a future that will inescapably count on good dealings with Pakistan and the Taliban.